Why militants love Islam

By sheila | Dec 6, 2005

Are extremists really using Islam to further their goals? The debate has gone on long enough, both in the Muslim and non-Muslim world. Radical Islam’s links with Islam, though tenuous in some parts, are unmistakable in others. Because the religion is not a monolithic block, it would be more helpful to ask: Which version of Islam do extremists use?

Last month, Muhammad bin Abdul Latif provided a name. Al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya; which he boldly accused of sharing the same murderous instincts as the Nazis. Al-Salafiyya, or Salafism, is a label many modern-day groups aspire to. They use it to describe themselves as continuing in the footsteps of the first three generations (Al-Salaf Al-Saalih) of Muslims, who epitomized the Golden Age of Islam. Though it often goes unsaid in Western media, extremist movements like the Salafi Group for Da’wa and Fighting (Algeria), Lashkar Jihad (Indonesia) and Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh frequently connect themselves with Salafism. For obvious reasons, most ordinary Salafists vehemently reject this association.

It is a mistake, however, to assume that Salafism only exists in one shade. The latter shares many characteristics with the Christian reformation, which gave birth to the Protestant movement. In its attempts to redefine orthodoxy, Protestantism descended into further and deeper schisms.

Though Salafism- in the hands of ‘reformers’ at least- has always obsessed over imposing uniformity on its adherents, the manner in which it arose means that uniformity can only exist within a particular stream of Salafism. Tariq Ramadan, a French academic, identifies at least three of them. All are implacable enemies of the other.

Nonetheless, Salafism’s appeal to militants can be found at the most fundamental level. Salafist groups share a number of ‘family resemblances’, so-called building blocks that Salafist thinkers build upon to produce workable ideologies. The keystone of Salafism is its rejection of the belief that the Koran and hadith should only be approached through the mediation of juristic Schools. Traditional Islam has four such schools (madhhabs), named after great jurists who had lived from the eighth to tenth century.

Breaking from tradition
Salafism has little patience with maddhabs. Right through history, only a rare number of scholars have attempted to eschew the authority of the madhhabs. One of the most famous is the thirteenth-century scholar Ibn Taimiyya, who remains widely acclaimed by all Salafists. He was the first one, after all, to champion Salafism’s central tenet, though the name had not yet been coined.

Despite its basic commonalities, Salafism’s streams differ bitterly. It is not difficult to see why.

On the one hand, scholars from madhhabs tap into the same primary sources and demand from their scholars the most rigorous personal traits and academic qualifications. Traditionalist voices like that of Malaysia’s Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat prefer to guide their students to the crucial issue by reporting matters of debate between Islamic scholars.

Respectful flexibility permeates the discourse of traditional Islam, which in turn motivates its adherents to more intimate study.

On the other hand, Salafism is more concerned with shaping Islam as a retort to either political or secular issues. Because those issues are themselves inconstant and temperamental, Salafism assumes an unstable character. It is unfair, however, to bluntly accuse Salafism of not sharing the same level of care as traditional Muslims in selecting its scholars, but the criteria and even the primary texts used between Salafism’s many flavors are as inconsistent as they are selective.

On a wide variety of issues, Salafism produces answers that detract from traditional Islam. This is inevitable. Salafism’s confidence is refreshing and speciously relevant in our fast-paced life. Furthermore, Salafist scholars often go out of their way to make Salafist ideas intelligible to the lowliest foot-soldier, but this usually entails reducing Islam to a superficial and ritualistic device.

Easy and ready answers, though, don’t necessarily translate into consistent answers. Hence, the deep resentment that stands between different shades of Salafism. America’s ‘war on terrorism’ has thrown up abundant opportunities for Salafist groups to label one another as being deviant and hence responsible for extremism. This, however, is mere politicking whose beginnings should have been anticipated by people familiar with Salafism’s basic attributes.

Revolutionary zeal
Salafism’s popularity depends heavily on the socio-political climate of countries. It falls flat in certain environments, and thrives in others. Unfortunately, the Middle East belongs firmly to the latter. Israel’s existence has allowed Middle Eastern regimes to maintain their grip on power and wealth by redirecting popular rage toward conspiracy theories involving Jews. The continued survival of dictators in the Middle East means that wealth is kept within a tight circle of the elite. Poverty and unemployment are high, and this has allowed a revolutionary, secessionist zeal to color most opposition parties. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is a classic example of a corrupt and brutal regime necessitating the birth of groups committed to its overthrow.

Because the ideology of these groups is essentially popularist and revolutionary, governments keep a watchful eye on it. However, it is no coincidence that more terrorists hail from European countries than Muslim ones. While Muslim authorities know precisely what preventive measures to take- closing down suspect madrassas, banning ‘jihadist’ publications, etc- Western authorities remain blissfully unaware of the distinction between ideological and true Islam. Extremists love the freedom that Western countries offers to them, for such freedoms usually entail blindness.

This blindness is criminal, as Muslim nations are beginning to understand. King Abdullah of Jordan, for example, vowed “relentless war” against those whom he dubbed takfiris. Takfir is the act of accusing a Muslim of unbelief and apostasy. It usually opens the door to execution. King Abdullah has no doubt that the recent bombings in Jordan which killed many Muslims are the work of such takfiris.

But most takfiri leaders had humble beginnings. Like Usama bin Laden, they are not scholars but reactionaries who evolved in opposition to the oppressive policies of their own governments. Such people labor under the tag of social reformer and understand the need for cloaking any socio-political message with an Islamic dress.

Consider the choices that such so-called reformers face.

On one side of the spectrum is traditional Islam, whose interpretations and judgments rest in the hands of scholars. Since traditional scholars hold extremely cautious opinions on ijtihad, or independent reasoning, they might not necessarily condone the changes that a reform movement attempts to impose. Centuries of political maneuvering by sultans through the ingenious use of fatawa (religious edicts) have also made traditional scholars cynical about colluding with any kind of power.

The uncompromising link with history and high scholarship that traditional Islam insists upon is unwieldy. More importantly, traditional Islam does not lend itself to being filtered through the lens of ideology. What emerges, after all, is ideology and not religion. Ideology represents a secession from orthodoxy. Thus, when the Taliban set out to bomb the ancient statues of Buddha in Bamiyan, they did so in direct opposition to Islamic scholars.

On the opposite side of the spectrum is Salafism, which gleefully mimics Ibn Taimiyya’s disdain for madhhab (and hence, traditional) scholars. The reformer’s choice is therefore not a terribly difficult one to make. Much of the Salafism that is exploited by extremists naturally attains separatist and exclusivist overtones. Reform movements, after all, seldom venture beyond the perception that they represent a vanguard against excesses committed by the majority. Syed Qutb was a great exponent of such narcissism.

Civil war
Since Salafism and traditional Islam differs markedly, it is more correct to say that the takfirism is a perversion of Salafism than it is a perversion of Islam. Like traditional Islam, though, Salafism’s moderates far outnumber its extremists. This imbalance is built on the inherent goodness of people and has so far prevented exponential growths in al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya’s ranks.

The actions of modern-day extremists are not new and did not arise from a vacuum. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States correctly

identifies today’s violence as being "…byproducts of an Arab civil war…", but incorrectly assumes that it had only begun 40 years ago. In fact, its origins stretch back to more than a thousand years, to the time when early Muslims had had to confront the Kharajites (seceders), a sect that labeled the larger ummah (Muslim community) as apostates.

In truth, while the Kharajites had been emphatically destroyed as a sect, its ideology remains appealing to modern groups who desire to distinguish themselves as being a ’saved’ remnant operating in a sick, corrupt majority. It appeals to the baser instincts of man and is overtly hostile to pluralism.

Modern-day extremists not only carve up the world into Muslim and non-Muslim halves, they also divide the Muslim world into what they perceive to be true and false believers. As far as they are concerned, the deaths of apostates is a religious duty.

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4 Comments so far
  1. John Burgess December 10, 2005 11:29 am

    A term to identify the extremist/violent interpretation of Islam, one that seems to be coming into more frequent use is “neo-salafist”. The term, created by Anthony Cordesman at CSIS, seeks to create a useful identification tag that does not malign the non-violent Salafists and Wahhabis.

    While the latter two are certainly fundamentalist and arguably “extremist” (depending on your POV, of course), they tend not to be violent and follow a more quietist approach to religion.

    That is clearly not the case of the violent, extremist, militants who use Islam to justify–or even define–their acts.

  2. thabet January 23, 2006 5:45 pm

    The Taliban were (are?) Deobandis and not Salafis. Deobandism is accepted as part of the Islamic tradition in India and follow Hanafi fiqah; they’re likely to be Maturidis in theology. Though on the Indian subcontinent Deobandis and Brelvis accuse each other being heretical or even kafirs in popular polemics, they are both considered Sunni traditionalists (the sniping between then is really over ritual and legalistic matters — the Brelvis are popularised as prefering a more devotional and less legalistic approach, whereas correct fiqh is important to Deobandis. Note that both are considered “deviated” by many Salafis.)

    Also you seem to have a very jaundiced view of Ibn Taymiyya. Indeed, it’s a very Salafi-like view of an individual who is a little more complex than his modern day champions — and detractors — would suggest. Afterall, he wrote commentaries on the works of famous Sufis, was a Hanbali jurist and discussed some intricate kalam issues (one claim made by a scholar about Ibn Taymiyya was that his arguments, though anti-kalam, were all “kalamistic”). All three knowledges being part and parcel of the Islamic traditions.

    salaam

  3. Yaser July 5, 2006 8:01 am

    I find you’re point of veiw very well articulated and interesting to read on these issues. Though I disagree that the Taleban were heavily influenced by the ‘Wahhabis’ they were definitely infuenced. Thabet is right, they are Deobandis, but they are also not the most brightest and well educated people, especially when you look at the higher level leadership (Mullah Omar, Mullah in Afghan scholarship hierarchy is not high, basically just above a student, not a Maulana or anything, yet he was at the top). What you may want to look into is the rise of the Taleban in terms of the other groups after the 1980s. The most Salafi-type group, the group that had the largest composition of Arabs and its leader spoke extermely eloquent Arabic, which he used to recruit Arabs, as well as reciever of a lot of aid during the 80s, the group of Abdul Rabb Rasool Sayyaf.

  4. dante July 5, 2006 6:37 pm

    Anyone who visits Afghanistan will now see that these places of shirk have ceased, and the annual celebrations at the mausoleums have been stopped. And likewise, the celebrations which were a remainder from the religion of the Magians which were acted upon before the arrival of the Taliban have been stopped. And also, the (Islamic) Emirate has ended those things which used to take place in the city of Mazar-e-Sharif after they had conquered it- things such as celebrations around that which was claimed to be the grave of ‘Ali (ra). So these things have been put to an end from the first day from a decree from the Council of Scholars. And the women have been prevented from visiting the graves, and signs have been put on the entrances of the cemeteries explaining the manners of Ziyarah according to the Shari’ah…

    [source]

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