Neo-Salafism has no coherent fiqh of its own- it bypasses the orthodox madhhabs
(Schools of Thought)- and has only the most basic and anthropomorphic theology.
Like Protestantism, it is fluid and tends to produce divisions and
sub-divisions. According to
Saudi Sheikh Abd Al-Muhsin Al-’Abikan, one of the reasons for this is the
habit of Salafist teachers to condemn "the
adherence to the legacy of jurisprudence (taqlid)" in young Muslims. The
preservation of legible streams of law, after all, asserts a kind of orthodoxy
and hence, unity. Other Salafist movements enjoin their members to derive Shariah (Islamic law)
from the Koran and ahadith (sayings of the Prophet) by themselves. The result is the
appalling state of division and conflict which mutilates Salafism’s condition.
Even so, according to
Tariq Ramadan, these divisions come in three distinct flavors.
Salafi Literalism- Salafi literalists reject the mediation of juristic Schools and their scholars when it comes to approaching and reading the texts. They call themselves salafis because they claim to follow the salaf, which is the title reserved for pious Muslims of the first three generations of Islam. The Quran and hadith are therefore interpreted without scholarly
conclaves. Salafi literalists generally forbid any interpretative, and presumably
permissive reading of the texts.
This school of thought believes that it is a direct descendant of those that very early on were called
ahl-al-hadith, which opposed interpretations based on the search for an injunction’s
objective, hence ahl-al-rayy.
The literalists insist on the necessity of reference and on the authenticity of the texts quoted to justify the minutest action and behavior, whether it is in religious practices, dress code or social
behavior. The doctrinal position of the salafi literalists and their groups in the west, which are in constant communication with scholars based primarily in Saudi Arabia, refuses any kind of involvement in a space that is considered non-Islamic, and this includes, perforce, Muslims whom they
put into a
list of deviants. Shia and Sufi Muslims rank high in that list, but
there is strong reason to believe that this sectarian supremacy extends to all other Muslims outside their fold.
Salafi Reformism- Salafi reformists share with salafi literalists a concern to bypass the traditional schools. They too, claim theological lineage with the salaf, with the aim of avoiding the commentaries of the eighth, ninth or tenth century scholars. However, in contrast with the literalists, their approach is to adopt a reading based on the purposes and intentions of law and jurisprudence. They are doctrinally closer to the
ahl-al-rayy.
Most groups within this trend that exists in the west grew out of the influence of late
nineteenth and early twentieth-century thinkers like Hassan al-Banna, Syed Qutb and al-Afghani. Their views are often divergent, but what unites them is their ‘dynamic’ approach to scripture and the use of reason to deal with perceived social ills, usually at the national level.
Political Literalist Salafism- While sharing many characteristics with the other salafi
flavors, this group
gels a literal reading of the texts with political
mechanisms usually concerning management of power, law, authority and
caliphate. The whole forms a complex blend that leans toward revolutionary
action. It is about opposing the ruling powers and struggling to establish the
so-called Islamic state in the form of a caliphate, by means of jihad if
necessary. Because political slogans are often involved, politically-literalist Salafism is unstable and extremely reactionary. Groups like Hizb al-Tahrir,
which faces the distinct possibility of being banned in United Kingdom, best
epitomizes this trend.
Getting along
The boundaries between the flavors are by no means cast in stone. Ideologues do express sentiments that cross over to another flavor, often without knowing it themselves. By and large, though, Salafism’s exclusivist roots
(the "us" versus "them" syndrome) almost certainly rule out the possibility of one flavor getting along with the others.
One of the finest examples of this mutual intolerance is the attitude of Saudi literalists to their reformist counterparts. Literalists like to allege doctrinal corruption in the teachings of al-Banna and Syed Qutb, two of the more famous
Salafi reformists of our time. Both had lived in Egypt, under the suzerainty of the
affable but iron-fisted Gamal Abdel Nasser. Both had been leaders of the Muslim
Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimoon) whose dearest wish had been to replace Nasser’s government with an Islamic one.
The literalists
compare Syed Qutb’s call for revolt to the
actions of the heretical Kharajite sect. While this is perfectly justified in
the light of traditional Islam, it is
conceivable that the Saudis only use this line of reasoning to stop
malcontents from nurturing similar ideas about the House of Saud. After all, the
same arguments that al-Banna and Syed Qutb utilized against the Egyptian regime
can just as easily be laid at Saudi Arabia’s doorstep.
Ahlan-wa-sahlan, Ikhwan (Welcome, Brother)
Saudi impressions on al-Banna and Syed Qutb only began to fall into place after
the end of the Arab cold war. The ten years between 1960-1970 was a period of uncertainty for pan-Arab unity. Saudi Arabia and Nasser’s Egypt seemed to be consumed by diplomatic row after diplomatic row.
Against this volatile background was the ever-growing popularity and threat of the Brotherhood. The group’s message was becoming more strident in tone. From prison, Syed Qutb urged for jihad to be waged against Nasser. Egypt was forced to act. It arrested and executed the group’s leaders, and kicked many of its members out of the country.
In a grim twist of irony, the fleeing Brothers did not have to look far for a second home. Egypt’s diplomatic-devil, Saudi Arabia, was more than willing to accomodate these ousted heroes.
The literalists’ campaign against Syed Qutb, and hence, Salafi reformists in
general, might seem odd. But there is a facet that is not often picked out
by observers who are unfamiliar with Muslim schisms and the rationale and dakwah
(activism) that drives them.
It began from an attempt to explain away the alarming
number of Saudi nationals who had participated in the 9-11 attacks on New York. The hijacked airplanes had not only brought down the twin towers of the World Trade Center, they had also demolished the relationship that Saudi Arabia had carefully nurtured with the United States. A new intitiative had to be drafted; old friendships rekindled.
As an opening shot, Saudi officials and ulema (religious authorities) began to adopt the stance that extremism had been, quite literally, imported into the kingdom. Under no circumstances were the state and religious policies of Saudi Arabia to be blamed. This absolution was enthusiastically hailed by some Western academics. In her book,
Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to
Global Jihad, Natana J. DeLong-Bas wrote:
"Although it is often posited that bin Laden’s ideology of global jihad has its origins in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s writings because both are Wahhabis, the reality is that bin Laden’s ideology owes far more to the writings of the medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyya and his contemporary interpreter, Sayyid Qutb, than it does to the writings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab."
While DeLong-Bas’ book was a welcome addition to Saudi Arabia’s
campaign of disavowal, the kingdom is by no means alone in its charm offensive. It’s backed by an influential lobby
group known as Aramco
Expats. The group consists of retired managerial and technical staff of
the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO).
Black gold to share around
A little perspective here.
Aramco’s history dates back to May 29, 1933, when Saudi Arabia
signed a concessionary agreement with Standard Oil of California (Socal)
allowing them to explore Saudi Arabia for oil. Standard Oil of California (Socal) passed
this concession to an affiliate called California-Arabian Standard Oil Co. (Casoc).
In 1936 with the company having no success at locating oil, the Texas Oil
Company (Texaco) purchased a 50% stake of the concession. It wasn’t until 1970
that Aramco was fully owned by the Saudi Government, yet
managed by American venture partners. Into this heady mix was added two more
successors of the Standard Oil Trust, namely Standard of New Jersey and Socony-Vaccuum, the progenitors of ExxonMobil.
These enterprises, together with the House of Saud, control the world’s largest
tap for petroleum. They also bind successive American presidents to an
unthinking defense of the Saudi status quo. Recent Frontline interviews
with
James Baker and
Brent Scowcroft clearly illustrate the degree of interest that the United
States has in this issue. Although Aramco later became Saudi-Aramco, its
relations with the United States continue in two vital fronts:
1. The continued employment of Americans through Saudi-Aramco’s branch office in Houston, Texas; intriguingly, America’s oil-capital.Not surprisingly, Aramco Expats has always devoted itself to defending Saudi interests in America. After 9-11, its role became especially important and visible. Together with its sister site, the Saudi-American Forum (SAF), it assumed the Saudi cause via the mystifyingly precise means of extricating Usama bin Laden from the 18th-century movement founded by Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. Their hearty endorsement of DeLong-Bas’ book should be seen in the context of the latter supplying the lobby with an effective weapon.
2. Robust contracts with firms like Halliburton, whose CEO-ship once sat in the lap of the current Vice-President Richard "Dick" Cheney.
"The main ideas and ways of thinking that drove men to carry out the September 11th, 2001 attacks in the name of Islam can only be understood by tracing them back to the writings of the Egyptian, Sayid Qutob and the Pakastani Abu Al-Ala Al-Maudoudi…All Islamic radicalism today springs from their teachings."Bad spelling aside (what’s up with Pakastani?), the Commission’s report is a word-for-word rundown of what the Saudis and their American proxies- what I call the ‘oil lobby’- had maintained all along. Syed Qutb, the man of the hour, had been a prominent thinker in the Muslim Brotherhood. The organization, so the Commission cheerfully continues, had been:
"…born in the Egyptian coastal city of Ismaeliya in 1928. After they were thrown out of Egypt during the Arab cold war between Nasser and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, (1960-1970), the Muslim Brothers went to Saudi Arabia. There they worked in the field of education. They were responsible for radicalizing Saudi students who were raised in the strict but quietist Wahabi tradition. Although many people in America have come to see Wahabyia as the source of all evil in Islam, in fact the Wahabi doctrine developed over the years in Saudi Arabia has been status quo oriented rather than radical. When the Saudis welcomed the members of the Muslim brotherhood they did so naively- not thinking that they were giving them a chance to influence young Saudis."So far, the literalist flavor has enjoyed great success in killing two birds with one stone. That is, disclaiming responsibility for the extremism of Saudi radicals, and shifting critical attention toward Salafi reformists instead. To force the point, Prince Nayef of Saudi Arabia accused the Muslim Brotherhood of being "the mother of all problems in the Arab world." Elsewhere in the Salafi playground, the Muslim Brotherhood was re-dubbed the Bankrupt Brotherhood. Because insults don’t often work as well as official-sounding names, the term Qutbism was invented to fill the gap. Clearly, it was in everybody’s interest not to play up the Bankrupt Brotherhood’s salafist base.
"We must object to the interpretation by a few among us that the phenomenon of violence and terror is entirely imported from outside our Saudi society. These [few] claim that the ideology that feeds this phenomenon was injected into our midst, and is foreign to our culture. Although there is some measure of truth in this claim, it explains only part of the phenomenon. Therefore, accepting it unreservedly is a type of escapism, blame-shifting, and self-exoneration. We have become accustomed to handling many of the negative phenomena in our Saudi society in this way."Tash goes on:
“The time has come for us to admit the bitter truth – the phenomenon of violence and terror has a domestic dimension… in our social culture, and primarily in its religious part. This culture suffers from many flaws that prepare the ground for growth of the ideology of violence and clashing with the others, instead of acting with tolerance. This flawed culture pushes our young people towards the same suspect streams [i.e. Al-Qaeda and other Islamist movements] that brainwash them and ultimately produce terrorists from among them."Naturally, if the war on radicalism, and hence the so-called ‘war of ideas’ is to be won, all the ideological flavors need to be placed under the microscope, with no qualifications or agendas to dictate who or what goes under a serious and objective study. History must be harnessed in its entirety; not just flattering portions that some apologists use as devices to deflect and more often than not stifle criticism.
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Excellent article.